Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice

Hypatia 31 (3):485-501 (2016)

Authors
Emmalon Davis
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider what hearers are obligated to do in response to these injustices. I argue that because epistemic harms to marginalized knowers also arise from prejudicially inflated assessments of their credibility, the virtue of testimonial justice must be revised to remedy them.
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DOI 10.1111/hypa.12251
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References found in this work BETA

A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2012 - Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 33 (1):24-47.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Exploitation.Nora Berenstain - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:569-590.
Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Varieties of Epistemic Injustice.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2017 - In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Médina Médina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice.
Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.

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