Utilitas 2 (1):40 (1990)
Bentham's dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one’, is frequently noted but seldom discussed by commentators. Perhaps it is not thought contentious or exciting because interpreted as merely reminding the utilitarian legislator to make certain that each person's interests are included, that no one is missed, in working the felicific calculus. Since no interests are secure against the maximizing directive of the utility principle, which allows them to be overridden or sacrificed, the dictum is not usually taken to be asserting fundamental rights that afford individuals normative protection against the actions of others or against legislative policies deemed socially expedient. Such non-conventional moral rights seem denied a place in a utilitarian theory so long as the maximization of aggregate happiness remains the ultimate standard and moral goal
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
When Equality Justifies Women's Subjection: Luce Irigaray's Critique of Equality and the Fathers' Rights Movement.Serene J. Khader - 2008 - Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 48-74.
An Egalitarian Plateau? Challenging the Importance of Ronald Dworkin's Abstract Egalitarian Rights.Alexander Brown - 2007 - Res Publica 13 (3):255-291.
Distributional Equality in Non-Classical Utilitarianism — A Proof of Lerner's Theorem for ‘Utilitarianism Incorporating Justice’.A. Schäfer & R. W. Trapp - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (2):157-173.
Back to Basic Values: Education for Justice and Peace in the World.Hugh Starkey - 1992 - Journal of Moral Education 21 (3):185-192.
Added to index2010-08-30
Total downloads43 ( #122,177 of 2,177,978 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,206 of 2,177,978 )
How can I increase my downloads?