Value and Agent-Relative Reasons

Utilitas 7 (1):31 (1995)

Authors
David McNaughton
Florida State University
Piers Rawling
Florida State University
Abstract
In recent years the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons has been taken by many to play a key role in distinguishing deontology from consequentialism. It is central to all universalist consequentialist theories that value is determined impersonally; the real value of any state of affairs does not depend on the point of view of the agent. No reference, therefore, to the agent or to his or her position in the world need enter into a consequentialist understanding of what makes an action right or wrong or morally permissible. Consequentialism thus provides an agent-neutral account of both the right and the good
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820800001825
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella.Jennie Louise - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent Neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.
Authorization and The Morality of War.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):211-226.
Is Agent-Neutral Deontology Possible?Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):319-324.
Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella.Jennie Lousie - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518-536.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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