Free acts and robot cats

Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57 (2001)

Authors
Torin Alter
University of Alabama
Abstract
‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller ’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue : whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that.
Keywords Causal Theory  Compatibilism  Free Act  Metaphysics  Reference  Heller, M
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010350211589
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.
The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.
(Metasemantically) Securing Free Will.Jason Turner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):295-310.
The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew H. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.

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