PDP networks can provide models that are not mere implementations of classical theories

Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):25-40 (1997)

Abstract
There is widespread belief that connectionist networks are dramatically different from classical or symbolic models. However, connectionists rarely test this belief by interpreting the internal structure of their nets. A new approach to interpreting networks was recently introduced by Berkeley et al. (1995). The current paper examines two implications of applying this method: (1) that the internal structure of a connectionist network can have a very classical appearance, and (2) that this interpretation can provide a cognitive theory that cannot be dismissed as a mere implementation.
Keywords Connectionism  Model  Network  Representation  Science
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DOI 10.1080/09515089708573202
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References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Curious Case of Connectionism.Istvan S. N. Berkeley - 2019 - Open Philosophy 2 (1):190-205.
Theory of Mind and Other Domain-Specific Hypotheses.C. M. Heyes - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1143-1145.

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