Excluded middle and bivalence

Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97 (1992)
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I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.



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Intuitionistic logic and its philosophy.Panu Raatikainen - 2013 - Al-Mukhatabat. A Trilingual Journal For Logic, Epistemology and Analytical Philosophy (6):114-127.

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References found in this work

Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
Formal semantics and logic.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1971 - New York,: Macmillan.
Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth.Vann McGee - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (10):530-539.

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