Bishop Butler's View of Conscience

Philosophy 24 (90):219-238 (1949)
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In this article I propose to examine Bishop Butler's view of the nature of moral judgment, the epistemological problem which so greatly exercised some of the British moralists of his age. I have discussed the views of four of them in The Moral Sense. The problem seems to have been peculiarly lacking in interest for Butler. This may seem at first sight an odd statement: the moral faculty, or conscience, it would be said, is the chief subject of Butler's moral writings. This is true enough. But although Butler's description of the working of conscience is unsurpassed, he gives no clear definition of the faculty. That is, he does not clearly consider the question whether the moral faculty can be said to be identical with some faculty usually called by another name, or whether it is sui generis



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Citations of this work

Butler's Theory of Moral Judgment.Roger A. Shiner - 1978 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 12:199-225.
Butler's Theory of Moral Judgment: R. A. Shiner.Roger A. Shiner - 1978 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 12:199-225.

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