Closure, defeasibility and conclusive reasons

Acta Analytica 22 (4):301 - 319 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
Some Inconclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’.Martin Curd - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:293-302.
Living without closure.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
Law and defeasibility.Jaap Hage - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):221-243.
Conclusive reasons that we perceive sets.David MacCallum - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (1):25 – 42.
Some conclusive reasons against 'conclusive reasons'.George S. Pappas & Marshall Swain - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):72 – 76.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
120 (#138,738)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Claudio de Almeida
Pontifícia Universidade Católica Do Rio Grande Do Sul

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 51 references / Add more references