Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):152-169 (2016)

J. R. Fett
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul
Claudio de Almeida
Pontifícia Universidade Católica Do Rio Grande Do Sul
For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of..
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2015.1009127
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):429-429.

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On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.

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