Shannon Dea
University of Regina
Taking my lead from Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin's distinction between “meaning pragmatism” and “inquiry pragmatism,” and guided throughout by Christopher Hookway's understanding of Peirce, I revisit some of the best-known locuses of both Peirce's meaning pragmatism and his inquiry pragmatism, and conclude that the distinction dissolves in Peirce. For Peirce, the very mechanism for elucidating a concept's meaning, the pragmatic maxim, requires ongoing inquiry. Moreover, in performing an inquiry, we elucidate meaning.
Keywords Peirce  Pragmatism  Inquiry  Meaning  Hookway
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DOI 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.51.4.02
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Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final Opinion.Aaron B. Wilson - 2018 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 10 (2).

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