Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (2):152-161 (2020)

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Contemporary neo-Aristotelianism attempts to ground normative constraints on action on the notion of human nature and this opens it to two main objections: Firstly, human nature seems to be too indeterminate to set constraints on action; secondly, it is unclear why knowledge of human nature should motivate agents. This essay considers the contribution that Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life can give in answering these challenges. It suggests that forms of life are not objects of analysis, but rather a new philosophical method, which allows us also to investigate human volitional capacities and their normative significance for practical rationality.
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DOI 10.1177/0191453718811857
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