What Moore’s Paradox Is About


Abstract
On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein’s views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00040.x
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
Knowledge in Perspective.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.

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