Authors
Claudio de Almeida
Pontifícia Universidade Católica Do Rio Grande Do Sul
Abstract
On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein's views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2653588
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,688
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
Moore’s Paradox in Belief and Desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio De Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33 - 58.
What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio De Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore.Cláudio de Almeida - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):48-73.
Analysis in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore.Frank Dominic Ferrara - 1980 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Moore's Paradox.Krista Lawlor & John Perry - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.
Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Justification.Robert Hambourger - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12.
Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Justification.Robert Hambourger - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
Informativeness and Moore's Paradox.Peter Pagin - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):46-57.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-02-19

Total views
4 ( #1,184,903 of 2,349,560 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #510,673 of 2,349,560 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes