Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271 (2008)

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Leon De Bruin
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
I discuss the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) as a new approach to folk psychology, by highlighting some of the main differences between the NPH and so-called 'principled approaches' and elaborating on the importance of the distinction between intentional and propositional attitudes. Furthermore, I address the question whether reason explanations as understood by the NPH constitute a distinctive and autonomous kind of explanation
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DOI 10.1080/13869790802239219
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References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.

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Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.

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