A new story about folk psychology

Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271 (2008)
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Abstract

I discuss the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) as a new approach to folk psychology, by highlighting some of the main differences between the NPH and so-called 'principled approaches' and elaborating on the importance of the distinction between intentional and propositional attitudes. Furthermore, I address the question whether reason explanations as understood by the NPH constitute a distinctive and autonomous kind of explanation

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Leon De Bruin
VU University Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Enculturating folk psychologists.Victoria McGeer - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1039-1063.
Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.

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