Dynamic Embodied Cognition

Abstract
Abstract   In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes in explaining some cases of social interaction—not yet up to the task. This is because they (1) do not pay sufficient attention to the role of offline processing or “decoupling”, and (2) obscure the cognitive gap by overemphasizing the role of phenomenology. We argue that the main challenge for the enactive view will be to acknowledge the importance of both coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes for basic and advanced forms of (social) cognition. To meet this challenge, we articulate a dynamic embodied view of cognition. We illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach by recourse to recent findings on false belief understanding. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9223-1 Authors Leon C. de Bruin, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany Lena Kästner, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.
Keywords Social cognition  Enactivism  Embodied cognition  Cognitive gap  False belief understanding
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9223-1
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,334
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Metaphors We Live By.George Lakoff - 1980 - University of Chicago Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 70 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks.Anna Ciaunica - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Implicit Mindreading and Embodied Cognition.J. Robert Thompson - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):449-466.
Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.
Introduction to Debates on Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):431-448.
Embodied Cognition and Mindreading.Shannon Spaulding - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.
Embodied Cognition.Fred Adams - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
The Embodied Cognition Research Programme.Larry Shapiro - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):338–346.
A Critique of Embodied Simulation.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):579-599.
Added to PP index
2011-09-26

Total downloads
96 ( #60,012 of 2,225,262 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #93,481 of 2,225,262 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature