Episteme:1-18 (forthcoming)

Authors
Abstract
Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; experience's epistemic value is “reflectively accessible”. In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves a puzzle disjunctivists face in their posture vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios. More systematically, presentational disjunctivism provides an especially compelling view of disjunctivism as an internalist view of perceptual consciousness by explaining the way perceptual presence manifests the subject's rationality in a distinct way.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/epi.2020.29
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,437
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis.Thomas Lockhart - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):1-30.
Either / Or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-19.
Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments.Craig French - 2019 - In Duncan Pritchard, Casey Doyle & Joe Milburn (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.
Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
The (Un)Holy Grail of Epistemology.Paweł J. Zięba - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1):21-33.
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):385-396.
McDowell’s Disjunctivism and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):277-292.
In Search of the Holy Grail of Epistemology.Paweł J. Zięba - 2014 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 28:55-74.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-09-04

Total views
22 ( #493,321 of 2,449,204 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #141,356 of 2,449,204 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes