Epistemic Injustice in Finance

Topoi 40 (4):755-763 (2019)
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Abstract

This article applies philosophical work on epistemic injustice and cognate concepts to study gender and racial disparity in financial markets. Members of disadvantaged groups often receive inferior financial services. In most jurisdictions, it is illegal to provide discriminatorily disparate treatment to groups defined by gender and skin colour. Racial disparity in financial services is generally considered to be discriminatory. The standard view among most regulators is that gender disparity is not discriminatory, though. Through an analysis of various exemplary cases, I propose testimonial injustice as a candidate explanation for some of the existing forms of racial disparity found in financial services. I show how prejudices about gender and finance decrease epistemic self-confidence, and how this leads to gender disparity. And I consider particularly intractable forms of self-fulfilling testimonial injustice.

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2019-10-04

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Boudewijn de Bruin
University of Groningen

References found in this work

Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
Epistemic Virtues in Business.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):583-595.

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