Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517 (2011)
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Abstract

According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances

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Author Profiles

Marc Slors
Radboud University Nijmegen
Leon De Bruin
VU University Amsterdam