On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents

In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer (2009)
Abstract
I argue that game theoretic explanations of human actions make implausible epistemological assumptions. A logical analysis of game theoretic explanations shows that they do not conform to the belief-desire framework of action explanation. Epistemic characterization theorems (specifying sufficient conditions for game theoretic solution concepts to obtain) are argued to be the canonical way to make game theory conform to that framework. The belief formation practices implicit in epistemic characterization theorems, however, disregard all information about players except what can be found in the game itself. And such a practice of belief formation is, I show, implausible.
Keywords game theory  action  epistemology  logic  belief  desire  epistemic characterization
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,162
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Game Theory and Conventiont.Neil Tennant - 2001 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):3-19.
Reasoning About Games.Melvin Fitting - 2011 - Studia Logica 99 (1-3):143-169.
Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
Logic for Dialogue Games.Lauri Carlson - 1994 - Synthese 99 (3):377 - 415.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-29

Total downloads

64 ( #79,582 of 2,152,457 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #225,917 of 2,152,457 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums