Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):133-156 (2019)

Authors
Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho
Federal University of Minas Gerais
Albert Newen
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Abstract
One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities.
Keywords Demonstrative Reference  Demonstrative Thought  Object representation  Object persistence
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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