Numerical cognition and mathematical realism

Authors
Helen De Cruz
Oxford Brookes University
Abstract
Humans and other animals have an evolved ability to detect discrete magnitudes in their environment. Does this observation support evolutionary debunking arguments against mathematical realism, as has been recently argued by Clarke-Doane, or does it bolster mathematical realism, as authors such as Joyce and Sinnott-Armstrong have assumed? To find out, we need to pay closer attention to the features of evolved numerical cognition. I provide a detailed examination of the functional properties of evolved numerical cognition, and propose that they prima facie favor a realist account of numbers.
Keywords Numerical cognition  Mathematical realism  Mathematical platonism  Evolutionary debunking arguments
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Enduring Enigma of Reason.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):513-524.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Constraint, Cognition, and Written Numeration.Stephen Chrisomalis - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (3):552-572.
Numerical Architecture.Eric Mandelbaum - 2013 - Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (1):367-386.
The Laterality Effect: Myth or Truth?☆.R. Cohenkadosh - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):350-354.
If There Were No Numbers, What Would You Think?Thomas Mark Eden Donaldson - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):283-287.
Realismo/Anti-Realismo.Eduardo Castro - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-09-13

Total downloads
263 ( #17,774 of 2,293,801 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
90 ( #3,503 of 2,293,801 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature