Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146 (2011)

Eros Carvalho
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one pretends that its application be suitable for the preference of hypothesis. I argue that the nature of this vindication is such that it may be applied also to induction. Thus, to be a popperian is a good reason also to be an inductivist.
Keywords Induction  Falsificationism  Practical Prediction  Justification
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
On Inductive Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1945 - Philosophy of Science 12 (2):72-97.
Rational Prediction.Wesley C. Salmon - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):115-125.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Kuhn Thomas - 1962 - International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 2 (2).

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