Authors
Johan De Smedt
University of Ghent
Helen De Cruz
Saint Louis University
Abstract
Despite their divergent metaphysical assumptions, Reformed and evolutionary epistemologists have converged on the notion of proper basicality. Where Reformed epistemologists appeal to God, who has designed the mind in such a way that it successfully aims at the truth, evolutionary epistemologists appeal to natural selection as a mechanism that favors truth-preserving cognitive capacities. This paper investigates whether Reformed and evolutionary epistemological accounts of theistic belief are compatible. We will argue that their chief incompatibility lies in the noetic effects of sin and what may be termed the noetic effects of evolution, systematic tendencies wherein human cognitive faculties go awry. We propose a reconceptualization of the noetic effects of sin to mitigate this tension
Keywords Reformed epistemology  Cognitive science of religion  Noetic effects of sin  Evolutionary epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2012, 2013
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11153-012-9368-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Introduction.Hans Van Eyghen, Rik Peels & Gijsbert Van den Brink - 2018 - In Hans Van Eyghen, Rik Peels & Gijsbert BVan den Brink (eds.), New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion - The Rationality of Religious Belief. Dordrecht: Springer.
Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-08-25

Total views
653 ( #6,885 of 2,324,951 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #8,740 of 2,324,951 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes