Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177 (2002)
The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
|Keywords||Response-dependence Values Nonnaturalism Realism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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