Two conceptions of response-dependence

Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177 (2002)

Authors
Rafael De Clercq
Lingnan University
Abstract
The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
Keywords Response-dependence  Values  Nonnaturalism  Realism
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1014708132150
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The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
The Structure of Aesthetic Properties.Rafael De Clercq - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):894-909.
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States: Part I.Julie Zahle - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):493-518.

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