Two conceptions of response-dependence

Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177 (2002)
Abstract
The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
Keywords Response-dependence  Values  Nonnaturalism  Realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1014708132150
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,208
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Structure of Aesthetic Properties.Rafael De Clercq - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):894-909.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

127 ( #38,152 of 2,172,663 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #28,466 of 2,172,663 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums