In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Jason Decker
Carleton College
Daniel Groll
Carleton College
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Keywords disagreement  moral disagreement  epistemic peers  self-defeat
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The Self-Undermining Arguments From Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.
The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.

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