Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249 (2015)
Abstract
Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value of philosophical intuitions, as well as for the interpretation of studies in experimental philosophy.
Keywords Philosophical Intuitions  Dual processing  Philosophical expertise  Experimental philosophy
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2014.967792
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References found in this work BETA
The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions.Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - In Edouard Machery & O'Neill Elizabeth (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 109-127.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.

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