Extending compatibilism: Control, responsibility, and blame

Res Publica 13 (3):209-230 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that 'moral responsibility' refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment.
Keywords blame  blameworthiness  control  freedom  free will  justice  moral responsibility  punishment  responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-007-9038-7
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