Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?

Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19 (2015)
Abstract
Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these costs. In brief, I assume that experiences of freedom have a sort of phenomenal content that is inaccurate if determinism is true, just as many incompatibilists claim. Still, I argue that these experiences also have another sort of phenomenal content that is normally accurate, even assuming determinism.
Keywords free will  moral responsibility  determinism  phenomenology  phenomenal content  Horgan  compatibilism  libertarianism  cognitive penetration  Chalmers
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2013.874495
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A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Minds, Brains and Science.John R. Searle - 1984 - Harvard University Press.

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The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.

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