Empirical Negation

Acta Analytica 28 (1):49-69 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An extension of intuitionism to empirical discourse, a project most seriously taken up by Dummett and Tennant, requires an empirical negation whose strength lies somewhere between classical negation (‘It is unwarranted that. . . ’) and intuitionistic negation (‘It is refutable that. . . ’). I put forward one plausible candidate that compares favorably to some others that have been propounded in the literature. A tableau calculus is presented and shown to be strongly complete

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-02-07

Downloads
111 (#153,932)

6 months
13 (#161,691)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael De
Utrecht University

References found in this work

The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The seas of language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Roberto Minio.
The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references