Why people believe in indeterminist free will

Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054 (2015)

Authors
Oisín Deery
York University
Abstract
Recent empirical evidence indicates that people tend to believe that they possess indeterminist free will, and people’s experience of choosing and deciding is that they possess such freedom. Some also maintain that people’s belief in indeterminist free will has its source in their experience of choosing and deciding. Yet there seem to be good reasons to resist endorsing. Despite this, I maintain that belief in indeterminist free will really does have its source in experience. I explain how this is so by appeal to the phenomenon of prospection, which is the mental simulation of future possibilities for the purpose of guiding action. Crucially, prospection can be experienced. And because of the way in which prospection models choice, it is easy for agents to experience and to believe that their choice is indeterministic. Yet this belief is not justified; the experience of prospection, and hence of free will as being indeterminist, is actually consistent with determinism.
Keywords Free will  Alternative possibilities  Determinism/indeterminism  Prospection  Causal modeling
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0396-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,305
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
Self-Projection and the Brain.Randy L. Buckner & Daniel C. Carroll - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):49-57.

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment.Eddy Nahmias - 2016 - In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Free Will Incompatible with Determinism?Marvin Zimmerman - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.
Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80.
Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
Is Free Will Compatible with Determinism?Clement Dore - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501.
Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions.Patricia Greenspan - 2000 - In J. H. Aguilar & A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of action: 5 questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.
Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma.Tina Talsma - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.
How to Be a Free People.Richard Ekins - 2013 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 58 (2):163-182.
Folk Intuitions on Free Will.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):57-86.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-10-12

Total views
65 ( #132,526 of 2,280,221 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #120,226 of 2,280,221 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature