Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures

Cognitive Science:134-160 (2018)
Abstract
People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country and a diverse set of interdependent countries. Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good.
Keywords Social cognition  True self  Moral reasoning  Concepts  Misanthropy  Culture
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017, 2018
DOI 10.1111/cogs.12505
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Essential Moral Self.Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):159-171.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2017-03-09

Total downloads
141 ( #39,478 of 2,237,230 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #6,137 of 2,237,230 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature