Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836 (2018)
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Abstract

Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.

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Job De Grefte
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck.Job de Grefte - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):240-255.
Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck.Job De Grefte - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15.
Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):531-549.
Is lucky belief justified?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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