Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836 (2018)

Authors
Job De Grefte
University of Groningen
Abstract
Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.
Keywords luck  justification  Pritchard  reflective luck  veritic luck  internalism  externalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1306-7
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck.Job De Grefte - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15.
Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck.Job Grefte - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):240-255.
Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.

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