Moving forward in bioethical theory: Theories, cases, and specified principlism

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (5):511-539 (1992)
The field of bioethics has deployed different models of justification for particular moral judgments. The best known models are those of deductivism, casuistry, and principlism (under one, rather limited interpretation). Each of these models, however, has significant difficulties that are explored in this essay. An alternative model, suggested by the work of Henry Richardson, is presented. It is argued that specified principlism is the most promising model of justification in bioethics. Keywords: casuistry, deductivism, ethical theories, intuition principlism, specified principlism, specification CiteULike Connotea What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/jmp/17.5.511
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George J. Agich (2005). What Kind of Doing is Clinical Ethics? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (1):7-24.

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