Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15 (2019)

Authors
Job De Grefte
University of Groningen
Abstract
This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.
Keywords Pritchard  epistemic luck  justification  knowledge  luck  modal account  pragmatic encroachment
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12341
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):550-571.
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism. E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.

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Citations of this work BETA

On luck and significance.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.

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