Abstract

I examine the moral theories of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre and attempt to answer two questions: Can these moral theories be reconciled into a coherent moral theory? Does a moral theory which integrates the theories of Taylor and MacIntyre provide a starting point for revising the natural law tradition? Through the process of a comparative dialectic, I develop a new "third" theory. What emerges is an understanding of the objectivity of an individual's orientation in social space. An orientation respects the social and historical particularities of the context in which we are situated yet provides a framework for assessing the morality of our decisions and actions. An orientation is established within the context of a defining community and is constituted by a relationship to a set of goods which provides us with a sense of directedness and authenticity. Both an orientation and a defining community reflect a commitment to style or tradition of enquiry. The argument I develop corresponds to a tradition of enquiry which is based on two commitments: the moral life is best understood in terms of how we orient ourselves to a telos--an understanding of what constitutes a good for human life; it is possible to identify an objective moral order in which we can establish the rationality of our decisions and actions. This tradition of enquiry is developed by Aristotle and strengthened by Aquinas, and is often referred to as the natural law tradition. I offer arguments for revising how the natural law tradition understands: the nature of an objective moral order; our knowledge of this order; and the nature of moral diversity