Value theory and the best interests standard

Bioethics 9 (1):50–61 (1995)
The idea of a patient's best interests raises issues in prudential value theory–the study of what makes up an individual's ultimate good or well‐being. While this connection may strike a philosopher as obvious, the literature on the best interests standard reveals almost no engagement of recent work in value theory. There seems to be a growing sentiment among bioethicists that their work is independent of philosophical theorizing. Is this sentiment wrong in the present case? Does value theory make a significant difference in interpreting best interests? In pursuing this question, I begin with a quick sketch of broad kinds of value theories, identifying representatives that are plausible enough to count as contenders. I then explore what each account suggests in neonatal treatment decisions, and decisions for patients in persistent vegetative states. I conclude that while these accounts converge somewhat in their interpretations of best interests, they also have importantly different implications
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8519.1995.tb00300.x
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Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-Being. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):169-189.

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