Bernard Bolzano, analyticity and the aristotelian model of science

Kant-Studien 92 (3):328-349 (2001)
Abstract
Quine's well-known ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that logical positivism works with a concept of scientific rationality that is based dogmatically on, among other things, the opposition analytic-synthetic.
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DOI 10.1515/kant.92.3.328
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