Erkenntnis:1-52 (2013)

Robert Van Rooij
University of Amsterdam
This paper combines a survey of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics with new models that fill some voids in that literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibrium-refinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9465-0
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,232
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Meaning.H. Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.
Intentional Vagueness.Andreas Blume & Oliver Board - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-45.
Communication, Meaning, and Interpretation.Prashant Parikh - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):185-212.
Rationalizable Signaling.Gerhard Jäger - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-34.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intentional Vagueness.Andreas Blume & Oliver Board - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-45.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
39 ( #242,945 of 2,329,878 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #582,921 of 2,329,878 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes