The analytic-synthetic distinction and the classical model of science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege

Synthese 174 (2):237-261 (2010)
Abstract
This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them.
Keywords Analytic-synthetic  Science  Logic  Kant  Bolzano  Frege
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9420-9
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References found in this work BETA

Wissenschaftslehre. [REVIEW]Bernard Bolzano - 2001 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (18):134-136.

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Modelling the History of Ideas.Arianna Betti & Hein van den Berg - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):812-835.

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