Authors
Sven Delarivière
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Abstract
Both a traditional notion of free will, present in human beings, and artificial intelligence are often argued to be inherently incompatible with determinism. Contrary to these criticisms, this paper defends that an account of free will compatible with determinism, the responsibility strategy (coined here) specifically, is a variety of free will worth wanting as well as a variety that is possible to (in principle) artificially construct. First, freedom will be defined and related to ethics. With that in mind, the two theses of free will are addressed (namely could have done otherwise and source origination) for both human beings and artificial agents.
Keywords Combatibilism  Ethics of artificial intelligence  Free will
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom Evolves.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Viking Press.
Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

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