Basic moods

Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538 (2006)
Authors
Craig Delancey
State University of New York at Oswego
Abstract
The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing moods as global changes in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of some moods
Keywords PERCEPTION   RESPONSES   STIMULI   EMOTION   MEMORY
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DOI 10.1080/09515080600806567
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References found in this work BETA

Being and Time.Martin Heidegger - 1962 - London: Scm Press.
The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intentionalism About Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
Camus’ Feeling of the Absurd.Thomas Pölzler - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14.
Toward a Phenomenology of Mood.Lauren Freeman - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):445-476.
Moods in Layers.Achim Stephan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1481-1495.

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