Authors
Nicolas Delon
New College of Florida
Abstract
[DRAFT / no longer under review / getting messy / feedback welcome ] This paper defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood. Both the basis and the form of personhood are relational, and both can eschew anthropocentrism.
Keywords personhood  moral status  directed duties  obligation  community  relational  persons  animals
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 1983 - University of California Press, C1983.

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