Hugur 28:146-162 (2017)

Authors
Finnur Dellsén
University of Iceland
Abstract
English abstract: This paper discusses the delicate relationship between traditional epistemology and the increasingly influential probabilistic (or ‘Bayesian’) approach to epistemology. The paper introduces some of the key ideas of probabilistic epistemology, including credences or degrees of belief, Bayes’ theorem, conditionalization, and the Dutch Book argument. The tension between traditional and probabilistic epistemology is brought out by considering the lottery and preface paradoxes as they relate to rational (binary) belief and credence respectively. It is then argued that this tension can be alleviated by rejecting the requirement that rational (binary) beliefs must be consistent and closed under logical entailment. Instead, it is suggested that this logical requirement applies to a different type of binary propositional attitude, viz. acceptance.
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.

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