Gricean Belief Change

Studia Logica 79 (1):97-113 (2005)

Abstract
One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Computational Linguistics
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-005-0496-7
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
On the Status of the Postulate of Recovery in the Logic of Theory Change.David Makinson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):383 - 394.
Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.

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