Gricean Belief Change

Studia Logica 79 (1):97-113 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,880

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Belief revision in a temporal framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof R. Apt & Robert Van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interactions. Amsterdam University Press.
The Logic of Belief Persistence.Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
Severe withdrawal (and recovery).Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503.
Some logics of iterated belief change.John Cantwell - 1999 - Studia Logica 63 (1):49-84.
Local change.Sven Hansson & Renata Wassermann - 2002 - Studia Logica 70 (1):49 - 76.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
451 (#64,340)

6 months
10 (#436,689)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?