Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):201-201 (2005)

Authors
Craig DeLancey
State University of New York at Oswego
Abstract
Lewis argues convincingly that a DS approach to emotion theory will be fruitful. He also appears to hold that there are DS principles that constitute a theory or are substantial empirical claims. I argue that this latter move is a mistake.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x05290040
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