Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):371-379 (2014)

Authors
Nicolas Delon
New College of Florida
Abstract
Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for ‘extrinsic moral status’ based on ‘extrinsic final value’. I show that the assumption of ‘moral individualism’, that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be the basis of both final value and moral status, and that dependence on such extrinsic properties is compatible with the requirement of agent-neutrality
Keywords intrinsic value  extrinsic  moral status  final value  moral standing
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00379.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,707
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Value in Ethics and Economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan & Mary Midgley - 1986 - The Personalist Forum 2 (1):67-71.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics.Caroline T. Arruda - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):471-490.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property?Carrie Figdor - 2014 - In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 139-156.
Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?Gabriele Contessa - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.
A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions.J. McKitrick - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
Categorizing Goods.Julie Tannenbaum - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol 5. Oxford University Press.
Instrumental Values €“ Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.
Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.
Extended Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-12-09

Total views
110 ( #82,698 of 2,333,199 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #60,485 of 2,333,199 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes