Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):866-868 (2017)

Authors
Finnur Dellsén
University of Iceland
Abstract
Suppose you and I are equally well informed on some factual issue and equally competent in forming beliefs on the basis of the information we possess. Having evaluated this information, each of us independently forms a belief on the issue. However, since neither of us is infallible, we may end up with contrary beliefs. How should I react if I discover that we disagree in this way? According to conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement, I should modify my original opinion by moving closer to your opinion. According to steadfast views, I should not.In the past decade or so, this issue has been addressed in hundreds of journal articles and a number of edited collections. The literature...
Keywords disagreement  conciliationism  equal weight view
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqw069
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Possible Disagreements and Defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Some Problems With Steadfast Strategies for Rational Disagreement.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):89-107.
Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.
Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.
Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Juan Comesana - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):237-252.
Is It Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-10-29

Total views
182 ( #56,885 of 2,444,894 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #149,359 of 2,444,894 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes