Philosophia 46 (2):281-294 (2018)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Well-being is that which is non-instrumentally good for a person. It is identical to how well someone's life goes. There are three main theories of well-being: hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and objective list theories. Each of these theories is subject to criticism, which has led some philosophers to posit a hybrid theory in which well-being is defined as taking pleasure in objective goods. One problem that comes with such an account is the possibility of what I will call harmless pleasures; that is, pleasures that while not taken in something bad, are neither linked to objective goods. It is counterintuitive to say that such pleasures do not make a person's life go better, yet this seems to be what hybrid theories entail. I call this the harmless-pleasure objection. In this paper, I argue that there is no obvious solution to this objection and this result casts doubt on hybrid theories of well-being.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s11406-017-9903-3 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.Jeremy Bentham, J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart - 1984 - Ethics 94 (2):355-356.
Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.James Griffin & Richard Warner - 1989 - Ethics 99 (3):625-636.
View all 15 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):219-227.
The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.
Renunciation, Pleasure, and the Good Life in the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads.Christopher G. Framarin - 2017 - Philosophy East and West 67 (1):140-159.
The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 307-337.
Impure Intellectual Pleasure and the Phaedrus.Kelly E. Arenson - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):21-45.
An Inconsistency in the Philebus?Joachim Aufderheide - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):817 - 837.
Subjectivity and Objectivity in Theories of Well-Being.Timothy Bruce Snow - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's Philebus.Gabriela Roxana Carone - 2000 - Phronesis 45 (4):257-283.
The Cyrenaics on Pleasure, Happiness, and Future-Concern.Tim O'Keefe - 2002 - Phronesis 47 (4):395-416.
Savoring Time: Desire, Pleasure and Wholehearted Activity. [REVIEW]Talbot Brewer - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):143-160.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2017-09-16
Total views
45 ( #221,289 of 2,403,163 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,980 of 2,403,163 )
2017-09-16
Total views
45 ( #221,289 of 2,403,163 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,980 of 2,403,163 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads