A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology

Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117 (2009)

Authors
Dan Demetriou
University of Minnesota, Morris
Abstract
I argue that Greene’s research, although fascinating for many reasons, doesn’t undermine deontological moral philosophy. This is because both sentimentalist and rationalist moral epistemologies, applied to deontological value, predict exactly the data Greene has found. My discussion proceeds in three steps. In the first section I summarize Greene’s brief against deontology. In the second section I draw on standard accounts of moral emotions to suggest that there are ‘deontological emotions’ made rational by appearances of ‘deontological value.’ Finally, I outline a modest but realist intuitionist account of moral intuitions that connects deontological emotion to putative deontological value in a way that predicts Greene’s findings.
Keywords Joshua Greene  fMRI  neuroethics  moral epistemology  moral intuitions
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200925111
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,179
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul.Joshua Greene - 2007 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge From Neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.
Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations.Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
Moral Cognition and Computational Theory.John Mikhail - 2008 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Volume 3. MIT Press.
Graham Greene on the Moral Significance of Violence.Graham Greene - 2009 - The Chesterton Review 35 (1/2):279-282.
Multi-System Moral Psychology.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-01-09

Total views
135 ( #61,151 of 2,285,628 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #71,261 of 2,285,628 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature