The Monist 96 (1):3-36 (2013)

Roberta De Monticelli
University Vita-Salute San Raffaele
Lynne Baker’s Constitution Theory seems to be the farthest-reaching and yet the most subtly elaborated antireductive metaphysics available today. Its original theoretical contribution is a nonmereological theory of material constitution, which yet has a place for classical and Lewisian mereology. Constitution Theory hence apparently complies with modern natural science, and yet rescues the concrete everyday world, and ourselvesin it, from ontological vanity or nothingness, and does it by avoiding dualism. Why, then, does it meet so many opponents—or rather, why are its many opponents so stubbornly resisting the very idea of constitution, in Baker’s form? One of the most resisted claims is. Is unity without identity—the feature distinguishing the relation between constituting and constituted things—the only nondualist way to oppose reductionism? What would be the price to pay for unity with identity—without reduction? What I call the Unitarian Tradition, going back to Plato, keeps working out the original Platonic way of constructing acomplex object as a Unity comprising a Collection, as opposed to the Aristotelian suggestion of opposing Collections and Substances. For once you have split things apart ontologically, unifying them again may prove a very hard task.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI monist20139611
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,899
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Lynne Baker on Material Constitution. [REVIEW]Michael C. Rea - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):607–614.
Persons, Social Agency, and Constitution.Robert A. Wilson - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):49-69.
Surviving Resurrection.Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique.William Hasker - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.


Added to PP index

Total views
84 ( #117,347 of 2,402,060 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #156,686 of 2,402,060 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes